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This article presents a comprehensive method to assess system security risks. The method includes a cohesive set 
of steps to not only identify a more complete set of security risks but also assess them in a systematic manner. The 
method is based on the integration of two kinds of models: (1) qualitative models emphasizing security risk factors 
and security requirement determination and (2) quantitative models that focus on formal evaluation and assessment 
of system security risks. Unlike most of the existing methods, the proposed method covers the whole process of 
system security risk assessment spanning all three phases—ascertainment of security requirements, measurement 
of evidence for security requirements, and evaluation of evidence against the needed security mechanisms. The 
article extends existing work on system security risk methods by incorporating new ideas of multifaceted security 
view and work system in a coherent set of steps. The article demonstrates the application of the proposed method to 
a real application and discusses the major results. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
More and more businesses are operating in a cyber-world. This phenomenon is presenting bigger challenges as well 
as opportunities to businesses. One of these challenges is maintaining a secure and stable business infrastructure 
for a smooth operation of business activities. Managing security risks to business systems is getting more and more 
complex and time consuming. Companies are facing security risks from multiple sources. According to a recent 
Bloomberg government study [Engleman and Strohm, 2012], “spies, criminals and hacker-activists are stepping up 
assaults on U.S. government and corporate systems, spurring efforts by Congress and President Barack Obama to 
shield infrastructure essential to U.S. national and economic security, such as power grids and water-treatment 
plants.” Furthermore, the security capabilities of many companies are lagging behind in dealing with the increased 
security risks [Deloitte, 2012a, 2012b]. Companies must evaluate their security capabilities and improve them 
effectively in order to deal with the increased threats to business systems. This article makes an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive method to assess security risks to systems. 
The main purpose of system security risk assessment is to evaluate and improve the security of a system under 
study. Just like any assessment [Ohia, 2011], system security risk assessment is a process involving several 
activities spanning from ascertaining security objectives and requirements to measuring the evidence of existing 
security mechanisms to evaluating and suggesting improvements in the security of a system. A complete system 
security risk assessment process is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. System Security Risk Assessment Process 
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The process in Figure 1 has three major phases. In the first phase, a work system’s [Alter, 2006, 2008] security risk 
factors are identified based on its scope and the work elements. A set of necessary security requirements are 
specified to help minimize the impact of the risk factors. An appropriate set of security mechanisms (controls) are 
then identified to support the security requirements. In the second phase, the security requirements are treated as 
assertions, and the security mechanisms are treated as evidences. It is assumed that these evidences exist in the 
work system under study. An appropriate data collection method is used to collect the strength of evidences 
presumed to be present in the work system. In the third phase, the evidences and their strength are analyzed and 
compared against the specified security mechanisms. An evaluation of the existing evidences is carried out and a 
recommendation is made, if necessary, to improve the security of the work system. 
As the diagram in Figure 1 suggests, a system security risk assessment process should cover all three phases—(1) 
the ascertainment of security risk factors, security requirements, and security mechanisms, (2) the measurement or 
the observation of security evidences present in the work system, and (3) the evaluation of the overall security of the 
work system. 
The current research on system security risk (SSR) assessment has made very good progress. Several research 
works [Alter and Sherer, 2004; Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005; Baker, Rees, and Tippett, 2007; Yadav, 2010] 
have focused on assessment models to support the ascertainment phase of the security risk assessment process. 
Other researchers [Stoneburner, 2002; Suh, 2003; ISO 27001; Karabacak, 2005; Caralli, Stevens, Young, and 
Wilson, 2007] have emphasized steps and methods to support the ascertainment phase. Other researchers [Sun, 
Srivastava, and Mock, 2006; Feng and Li, 2010] have focused on the measurement and evaluation phases of the 
assessment process. Most of the research on system security risk, however, has taken only a partial view of the 
system security risk assessment. A system security risk assessment method should follow the process described in 
Figure 1 and address the following basic questions: 
1. Does it provide guidelines to ascertain the needed security requirements and mechanisms of a work 
system? 
2. Does it provide a way to collect empirical evidence on the security mechanisms present in the work 
system? 
3. Does it provide a way to evaluate the incongruence between the existing and the desired security 
mechanisms of the work system? 
The first question deals with the ascertainment of security goals and requirements of a work system. The second 
question deals with the collection of evidence on the existing security mechanisms in the work system. The third 
question deals with the evaluation of the differences between the existing and the desired security mechanisms of 
the work system. These three questions cover the entire cycle of an assessment process. 
This article presents a comprehensive method to determine risk-factor-based security requirements of a system and 
use them to assess the system’s security risks. The method is useful not only for identifying security requirements 
but also for evaluating the existing security mechanisms against a set of security requirements and assessing the 
overall system security risks. 
The article is organized as follows. Section II presents the literature review. Section III discusses the proposed 
system security risk method. Section IV demonstrates the application of the method to a real business case. Section 
V compares the proposed method with the extant methods. Section VI discusses the future research and 
conclusions, and Section VII presents the limitations. 
II. SSR ASSESSMENT LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several researchers [Rainer, Snyder, and Carr, 1991; Alter and Sherer, 2004; Vorster and Labuschagne, 2005; 
Schneider, 2010] have presented an extensive review of the literature on information system security risk 
assessment. Rainer et al. [1991] have discussed IT risk analysis methods that try to measure loss exposure to IT 
assets from various threats. They classified methods into two categories—quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative 
methods require quantitative data and use a mathematical function to relate an IT asset’s loss-exposure to its 
vulnerability to a threat multiplied by the probability of the threat being realized [Rainer et al., 1991]. Qualitative 
methods use descriptive variables instead of numbers to express IT assets’ values and the threat likelihood. 
Qualitative methods save time and effort but are inexact in nature [Rainer et al., 1991]. Rainer et al. suggest using a 
combination of various methods in order to achieve the best results. They propose an eight-step risk analysis 
process that incorporates quantitative and qualitative methods and uses a value chain to identify IT components of 
each value activity, IT assets, threats, and IT assets’ exposure to threats. However, an application of the risk 
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[Alter and Sherer, 2004; Sherer and Alter, 2004] have focused on IS risk models. They have clarified several IS risk 
management-related issues. Alter and Sherer studied forty-six articles about IS risk and categorized these articles in 
terms of definition of risk, model or methods used, type of system or project, and number and type of risk variables. 
They have proposed a more comprehensive model for analyzing and managing risks. The model provides a good 
framework for identifying, evaluating, and responding to risks of a work system [Alter, 2002] under various sources 
of uncertainties, given the goals and expectations of the work system. Vorster and Labuschagne [2005] developed a 
framework to compare various information security risk analysis methods. First, they used five existing methods—
two qualitative methods (OCTAVE [Caralli et al., 2007] and CORAS [Stolen et al., 2002]) and three quantitative 
methods (ISRAM [Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005], CORA―International Security Technology Inc. [IST Inc., 
2000], and Information Systems [IS] analysis based on a business model [Suh and Han 2003]) to develop the 
criteria for their framework. Then, they use the criteria to compare other information security risk analysis methods. 
Some of the criteria are: whether risk analysis is done on single assets or groups of assets, where in the 
methodology risk analysis is done, the people involved in the risk analysis, and the main formulae used. The criteria, 
as can be seen, are based on what some of the extent methods provide and are not based on what organizations 
need in order to conduct an effective information security risk analysis. Schneider [2010] discusses information 
security risk management models and analysis techniques within the context of e-government. The security risk 
faced by an e-government is expansive because of the open nature of e-government [Schneider, 2010]. He has 
reviewed two security risk assessment processes—the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
assessment process [Stoneburner, Goguen, and Feringa, 2010] and Whitman and Mattord’s [2010] assessment 
process. He concludes that the overarching theme of the risk management processes is the emphasis on the risk 
assessment and the risk mitigation plan. He also discusses criminological threat assessment techniques and finds 
an abundance of similarities between the two. Most of the assessment methods have focused on doing risk analysis 
and planning. Very few researchers [Sun et al., 2006; Feng and Li, 2010] have focused on the risk measurement 
and its evaluation. 
In this article, we present a review of the SSR literature with respect to the overall security risk assessment process 
presented in Figure 1. 
For the ascertainment phase, we examine models and methods to see if they provide: 
 Any guidelines to help find security requirements and mechanisms. Some methods and models include 
very clear and detailed guidelines to help find security requirements and mechanisms, while others 
provide few guidelines. We use the scale of No Guideline, General Guideline, and Clear Guideline to 
compare various methods. 
 Any output at the end of the ascertainment. Methods produce different kinds of outputs (results) at the 
end of the ascertainment phase. Some methods produce a listing and others produce a profile of the 
needed security requirements and mechanisms. 
For the measurement phase, we reviewed models and methods to see if they provided any technique for measuring 
and collecting data as evidence of existing security mechanisms. We also examined the output format of the 
measurements. 
For the evaluation phase, we reviewed methods and models to see if they provided any guidance for analyzing the 
existing security mechanisms and comparing them with the needed security mechanisms in order to determine the 
incongruence between them. We also examined the end result of the evaluation phase supported by the methods 
and models. 
Comparison of Extant System Security Risk Assessment Methods and Models 
We compared various SSR models against the criteria of ascertainment, measurement, and evaluation phases. We 
also compared several SSR methods against the same set of criteria. We found that most of the SSR models and 
methods emphasized mainly the ascertainment phase of the SSR assessment process. For example, Alter and 
Sherer [2004) have developed a comprehensive model of information system risk. The model clarifies the concept of 
risk factors and its temporal nature and clearly recognizes the risk management activities. The model [Alter and 
Sherer, 2004; Sherer and Alter, 2004] provides guidelines in identifying various risk factors. However, the model 
provides few guidelines for conducting risk analysis and identifying security requirements and mechanisms. We also 
found that few methods emphasized the measurement and evaluation phases but ignored the ascertainment phase. 
For example, Sun, Srivastava, and Mock [2006] present a set of steps for measuring and evaluating system security 
risks. However, their method provides few guidelines for the ascertainment phase of the assessment process. Very 
few extant models and methods address all three phases of the SSR assessment process. 
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In addition to our own qualitative comparison of SSR models and methods, three security risk experts also 
compared the methods and models. To improve the scientific rigor of a qualitative comparison of models and 
methods, an inter-rater reliability testing of three experts’ independent comparison results was performed. We invited 
three experts (two MIS professors and one MIS Ph.D. student) in the security risk assessment field to compare 
seven models and nine methods using the ascertainment, measurement, and evaluation criteria. A forty-eight-
question survey—with three questions per model/method—was prepared. Figure 2 shows the scale and a few 
sample questions from the survey. Questions relate to ascertainment, measurement, and evaluation phases. Each 
question has five possible choices—0, 1, 2, 3, and 4—as defined in Figure 2. The forty-eight-question survey was 
emailed as an attachment to each expert on April 5, 2012. A link to a Dropbox folder containing literature related to 
the seven models and nine methods was also provided to the experts for easy reference. The survey was completed 
by April 16, 2012. Each of the three experts (raters) answered all forty-eight questions. 
 
Figure 2. The Rating Scale and a Few Sample Survey Questions 
Survey Results 
Based on the data from the questionnaire, mean scores for each model and each method for different criteria were 
calculated, and an inter-rater reliability was determined by using the method in James’ [1984] work. The overall inter-
rater reliability for the comparison of SSR Models and Methods was 0.99 and 0.98, respectively. Even though there 
are no established standards for an acceptable level of reliability, Neuendorf [2002] reviewed “rules of thumb” set out 
by several methodologists and concluded that “inter-rater reliability coefficients of .90 or greater would be acceptable 
to all, .80 or greater would be acceptable in most situations, and below that, there exists a great disagreement” (p. 
145). The overall inter-rater reliability score for the comparison of SSR Models and Methods shows that all experts 
gave the same or similar scores to each of the survey items. Table 1 separately show the comparison of SSR 
Models and Methods. The numbers in parentheses show the inter-rater reliability scores for the corresponding 
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Table 1: Comparison of SSR Models 
Phase Ascertainment Measurement Evaluation 
Variable Support for Ascertainment 
phase: Guidelines to help 
find security requirements, 
mechanisms, and outputs 
Support for Measurement 
phase: Guidelines for data 
collection and outputs 
Support for Evaluation 
phase: Guidelines for 
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a: the mean of rating scores; b: Inter-rater reliability of three experts 
 
 
III. COMPREHENSIVE METHOD FOR SSR ASSESSMENT 
Here we discuss a comprehensive method, henceforth called the Multi-View Work System Security Assessment 
(MVWSSA) method, for assessing the security risks of a work system. We start with the identification of the assets 
and determine a complete set of security risks. An appropriate set of security requirements are then identified to 
counter the security risks. A set of security mechanisms is determined to implement the security requirements. For 
evaluation, we turn around and treat the security requirements as assertions and the associated security 
mechanisms as evidence to develop an assertion–evidence diagram. The strength of evidence is collected for the 
work system under study. The assertion–evidence diagram is then used to analyze and evaluate the security risks, 
and a recommendation report is prepared. The proposed method consists of the following steps: 
1. Establish the target work system and the scope of the risk assessment. 
2. Identify assets belonging to the work system’s elements. 
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3. Identify risk factors for each asset using Six-View Perspective of System Security (SVPSS). 
4. Evaluate and prioritize security risk from risk factors. 
5. Identify security requirements (assertions) to prevent and mitigate the security risks. 
6. Establish preventive and mitigation security mechanisms (evidences) present in the system to help 
manage the security risks. 
7. Develop security assertion-evidence diagram for each asset. 
8. Collect and represent the strength of evidence. 
9. Assess the overall level of security risk to each asset. 
10. Recommend preventive and mitigation security mechanisms. 
Each step is discussed below in details. 
Step 1. Establishment of Target Work System and the Risk Assessment Scope 
This step establishes the purpose and the context of the assessment effort. The purpose relates to the reason as to 
why we want to conduct certain activities. The context relates to the subject matter of the assessment under 
consideration. A clear understanding of the purpose and context results in a more precise boundary and scope of 
the assessment activities. A work system should be identified with a well-defined boundary. Identification of the 
security risks of a system requires a deep understanding of its processing environment. The work system-related 
information, such as the system’s mission, security policies, system interfaces, business processes, etc., should be 
collected. Steve Alter [2006, 2008] provides a comprehensive work system framework for understanding and 
defining organizational systems. We use his definition of a work system and its elements to collect information on 
the boundary and the scope of the risk assessment of a system. 
Step 2. Identification of Assets Belonging to the Nine-Elements of Work System 
Identification of all the assets that might face security threats is one of the most critical activities in assessing 
security risks. We use the Work System framework [Alter, 2006, 2008] to provide a more complete guideline for 
identifying all assets that might be under security risk. Table 2 lists typical assets under the integration of these two 
frameworks. In order to identify a more complete set of assets under each work element, each work system element 
[Alter, 2006, 2008] can be viewed from multiple perspectives such as the management, process, and resource 
perspectives. Table 2 can be used as a guide by system analysts to identify a more complete set of assets 
belonging to a work system under study. 
Step 3. Identification of Risk Factors for Assets Using Six-View Perspective of System Security (SVPSS) 
Risk factors, here, represent various sources of risks to assets [Alter, 2002]. In this step, we use the SVPSS 
framework [Yadav, 2010] to identify all sources of risks for assets. Each asset, identified in Step 2, is examined 
under each view of SVPSS for a security risk. Table 3 illustrates typical risk factors under each view. These risk 
factors can be used as a guide to enumerate specific risk factors for each asset. 
Step 4: Evaluation and Prioritization of Security Risks from Various Risk Factors 
We analyze and evaluate security risks from the identified risk factors by following some of the steps of the risk 
assessment methodology by CMS [2005]. Several works [Stoneburner et al., 2002; Australia, 2004; NIST, 2004; 
ISO, 27001; CMS, 2005] have presented a similar process to conduct risk analysis and evaluation. We adopt the 
risk analysis and evaluation steps of the risk assessment methodology by CMS [2005]. These two steps involve the 
following tasks: 
 Estimate each risk factor’s likelihood of occurrence. 
 Establish the severity impact if the risk materializes. 
 Determine the level of risk based on the risk factor’s likelihood and its impact. 
 Establish acceptable level of risk for evaluating risks. 
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Table 1: An Extensive List of Typical Assets Under Each of the Work System’s Elements 
Work System 
Elements 
List of Assets Under Each of the Work System’s Elements 
Processes 
and Activities 
Process Interface, Process Infrastructure, Process Operator, Process Manual, Process 
Standards, Compliance Process, Process Policy, Process Ownership, Planning and Control 
Mechanism Within a Process, Process Methods, Process Design, Process Execution, Process 
Assessment Criteria, Process Assessment Measures 
Participants Worker, Manager, Leader, Team, Manager Skills, Worker Knowledge, Team-Skills, Employee-
confidentiality, Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance, Individual Accountability, Personnel 
Screening, Security Awareness Training, Personnel Policy, Remediation Policy, Process-
training, Process–Actor Interface, Code of Practice, Performance Criteria, Performance 
Evaluation, Assessment Training 
Information Data Backup, Work System (i.e., Organizational) Knowledge, Personal Information, Access 
Rights, Evaluation of Access Rights, Privacy Law Compliance, Privacy Policy, Information-
sharing Policy, Policy Review, Policy Administration, Process Inputs, Process Outputs, Process 
Maintenance, Process Design Standards, Process Monitoring, Assessment Policy, Assessment 
Method, Assessment Data 
Technologies Laptop, Desktop, Tablet PC ; Software Application, Application Manual; Access Control; 
Management Techniques; Monitoring Tools; Tracking Tools; User-interface; Technology-
process Integration; Technology Assessment Policy; Technology Assessment Criteria 
Products & 
Services 
Product Review, Product Packaging, Service Review, Product Specification, Service 
Specification, Product Design Standards, Product Compliance, Service Compliance, Quality 
Control, Quality Monitoring, Product Inspection, Product Evaluation, Product Design Process, 
Service Design Process, Product Manufacturing Process, Quality Assurance Criteria, Quality 
Assurance Policy 
Customers Customer, Employee, Customer Goodwill, Customer Data, Employee Data, Customer Privacy 
Compliance, Employee Privacy Compliance, Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance, ADA 
Compliance, Customer Privacy Policy, Employee Privacy Policy, Remediation Policy, Employee 
Accountability, Security Awareness Training, Personnel Screening Policy, Duty Segregation 
Policy, Employee Termination Security Policy; Customer Care Process, Employee Care 
Process, Employee Grievance Handling Process, Quality of Service Criteria, Quality of Service 
Policy, Quality of Service Assessment 
Environments Workplace Location, Location Perimeter, Human Resource; Control–Environment, Workplace 
Culture, State Environmental Regulations, Federal Environmental Regulations, Human 
Resource Policy, Control–Environment Policy, Secure Workplace Policy, Human Resource 
Hiring Process, Human Resource Management Process, Workplace Design Process, Location 
Perimeter Security Criteria, Location Perimeter Security Assessment, Workplace Security 
Assessment 
Infrastructure Server, LAN, Router, Disk Array, Building, Shared Database, Server Applications, Software 
License, Database License, Software Maintenance Agreement, Software Training, Software 
License Policy, Software Maintenance Policy, User Training Policy, Infrastructure Security 
Policy, Building Security Policy, Infrastructure Design Process, Infrastructure Review Process, 
Server Setup Process, Infrastructure Performance Criteria, LAN Security Assessment 
Strategies Work System Operation, Work Force, Work Design, Work Schedule, Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA) Compliance, OSHA-related Work System Policy, Work Design Policy, Work 
Schedule Policy, Work Assembly Process, Work Design Process, OSHA Compliance 
Assessment, Work System Operation Assessment 
 
We use a security risk register [Yadav, 2010] to document the risk evaluation outcome. A security risk register is a 
compact and tabular representation of risk details about each risk factor. A sample security risk register template is 
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Table 2: Risks Under Six-View Perspective of System Security Framework [Yadav 2010] 
Six-View Perspective Typical Risk Factors 
Threat View Natural disasters, malicious threats, non-malicious threats 
Resource View Non-availability, compromised integrity, disclosure of confidential resources 
Process View Weak points in a process, vulnerabilities in the interface between the actors and the 
processes, and failures of processes 
Assessment View Inadequate and poor assessment criteria, inadequate assessment methods and 
procedures, lack of clarity and transparency in assessment methods, and lack of clear 
roles and responsibilities of assessment staffs 
Management View Poor and/or the lack of policy, accountability, administration, monitoring, remediation 
Legal View Violation of security and privacy laws, security-related legal uncertainties, and litigation 
 
 












































 Note:  
a
 Values are: Negligible, Very Low, Low, Medium, High, Very High, or Extreme 
b 
Values are: Insignificant, Minor, Significant, Damaging, Serious, or Critical 
c 
Values are: Nil, Low, Medium, High, or Very High 
d
 Values are: Very Low, Low, Moderate, High, or Very High 
e
 Values are: 0 = Very Low, 1 = Low, 2 = Moderate, 3 = High, or 4 = Vey High 
 
Figure 3. Security Risk Register Template to Document Risk Factors 
 
Figure 3 shows only the headings for each column in the security risk register. These columns will be completed in 
the subsequent steps. The security risk register template, as shown in Figure 3, has one main row for each identified 
asset. For each asset-row, there can be several risk factors under various security views. For each risk factor, a 
threat likelihood estimate and an impact severity is determined. Threat likelihood is an estimate of the frequency or 
chance of a threat happening [NIST, 2004]. Qualitative measures are used to specify the threat likelihood estimate 
and the impact severity level. Several works [Australia, 2004; CMS, 2005] on risk analysis use qualitative scales for 
defining and determining the threat likelihood and its impact. For example, a qualitative scale consisting of 
“Negligible,” “Very Low,” “Low,” “Medium,” “High,” “Very High,” and “Extreme” values can be used to specify the level 
of threat likelihood estimate. Table 4 defines the scales based on the CMS Information Security Risk Assessment 
(RA) Methodology [CMS, 2005]. An alternative interpretation of the scale values in terms of probability, shown in 
Table 4, gives additional information about the nature of likelihood estimation. 
Table 3: Likelihood Scale Description 
Scale for Likelihood 
Estimate 
Scale Description An alternative description in terms 
of probability 
Negligible Unlikely to occur > 1/10,000 
Very Low Likely to occur two/three times every five years > 1/1,000 
Low Likely to occur once every year or less >1/100 
Medium Likely to occur once every six months or less >1/10 
High Likely to occur once per month or less >1/5 
Very High Likely to occur multiple times per month >1/2 
Extreme Likely to occur multiple times per day >3/4 
 
Table 5 defines the scale for the impact severity level [CMS, 2005]. The impact severity scale is defined based on 
several works [ISO, 27001; Stoneburner et al., 2002; and Shrestha, 2004] on security risk assessment. The scale 
description and their association with the financial loss amount in Table 5 should help an analyst establish the most 
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Table 4: Impact Severity Level Scale 
Impact Severity Scale Description Financial Loss (in US$) 
Insignificant Will have almost no impact if the threat occurs 
Will result in minimal loss of functional integrity 
Requires little or no recovery cost 
Up to 10,000 
Minor Will have some minor effect on the business function 
May cause minor financial loss, but will not result in negative 
publicity or political damage 
Will require only minimal effort to complete corrective actions 
and continue or resume operations 
10,001 to 100,000 
Significant Will result in some tangible harm, albeit negligible, and 
perhaps realized by only a few individuals or agencies 
May cause political embarrassment, negative publicity, and 
moderate financial loss 
Will require a moderate expenditure of resources to repair 
100,001 to 500,000 
Damaging May cause damage to the reputation of the company, and/or 
notable loss of confidence in the ability for the company to 
complete its stated business mission 
May result in legal liability, and will require significant 
expenditure of resources to complete corrective actions and 
restore operations 
500,001 to 1,000,000 
Serious May cause considerable disruption in the business function 
and/or loss of customer or business partner confidence 
May result in compromise of large amount of government 
information or services, a substantial financial loss, and the 
failure to deliver CMS public programs and services 
1,000,001 to 5,000,000 
Critical May cause an extended disruption in the business function, 
and may require recovery in an Alternate Site environment 
May result in full compromise of the company’s ability to 
provide public programs and services, and complete the 
stated business mission 
Above 5,000,000 
 
A risk level or simply a risk is defined as a function of the likelihood of a given risk factor and its impact severity. A 
risk level is then computed using the following expression shown as (1): 
 
 
The level of risk can be easily determined by using the risk level matrix in Table 6. Each cell in Table 6 shows a risk 
level value for each combination of threat likelihood estimate and impact severity level based on Equation 1 above. 
For example, using Equation 1, a threat likelihood value of “Low” combined with the impact severity level of “Minor” 
results in a value of “Low” as shown in Table 6. Thus, the scale for a risk level can be specified in terms of “Very 
Low,” “Low,” “Moderate,” “High,” and “Very High” [CMS, 2005]. 
Table 5: Risk Levels Based on the Combinations of a Likelihood Occurrence 




Insignificant Minor Significant Damaging Serious Critical 
Negligible Very Low Very Low Very Low Low Low Low 
Very Low Very Low Very Low Low Low Moderate Moderate 
Low Very Low Low Moderate Moderate High High 
Medium Very Low Low Moderate High High Very High 
High Low Moderate High High Very High Very High 
Very High Low Moderate High Very High Very High Very High 
Extreme Low Moderate Very High Very High Very High Very High 
 
According to Table 6, we have five levels of risk level. Table 7 assigns a numerical value for each risk level. 
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Table 6: A Numerical Rating for Each Risk Level 
Risk Level Numerical Value 




Very High 4 
 
Thus, a risk priority rating level can be computed based on a given acceptable risk level rating using the following 
expression shown in (2): 
 
A resultant risk level rating is a value from Table 7 based on the values of the threat likelihood and impact severity 
as per Table 6. An acceptable risk rating is a risk rating that is acceptable to the organization under study. The 
acceptable risk rating is specified by the owner of the work system under study. A numerical value between 0 and 4, 
as shown in Table 7, is used to specify an acceptable risk rating level. Thus, using Tables 6 and 7 and the risk-rating 
computation expression of (2), a risk priority rating level can be computed for each risk factor listed in the security 
risk register. 
The above computational process to estimate the threat likelihood and the various risk levels are discussed 
extensively in various literatures [NIST, 2004; ISO, 27001; CMS, 2005]. 
Step 5. Identification of Security Requirements (Viewed as Assertions) to Mitigate Security Risks 
By now, we have identified the risk priority rating for each risk factor of an asset. A risk priority rating level shows the 
importance of a risk factor. The higher the risk priority level of a risk factor, the higher is the need to identify the 
appropriate security requirements in order to mitigate the impact from that risk factor. A security requirement can be 
viewed as an action that a work system must take to protect itself from various risk factors. Table 8 illustrates typical 
security requirements under each security perspective. Table 8 can act as a guide/checklist to identify security 
requirements. 
A comprehensive set of security requirements enables a work system to come up with a more complete set of 
mechanisms (controls) to manage security risks. 
Table 8: Security Requirements Under Six-View Perspective of System Security Framework 
Six-View Perspective Typical Security Requirements 
Threat View Backup data, Detect Intrusion, Thwart Flood Attack, Thwart Buffer Overflow Attack, etc. 
Resource View Maintain Confidentiality of a resource, Maintain Integrity of a resource, Maintain 
Availability of a resource, Maintain Reliability of a resource 
Process View Develop secure processes for dealing with threats, Develop secure processes for 
protecting resources, Develop secure processes for managing legal and privacy 
requirements, Manage secure process integrity, Conduct audit of secure processes 
Assessment View Conduct periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of security policies and 
plans, Define assessment policy, Evaluate assessment criteria 
Management View Establish Security Policy and Procedures, Establish Accountability, Administer Security, 
Monitor Security, Handle remediation 
Legal View Enable Privacy, Comply with Privacy and Security Laws 
Step 6. Specification of Security Mechanisms (Evidences) to Help Manage Security Risks 
Mechanisms refer to standards, methods, techniques, and tools that can be implemented into a work system to deal 
with threats and other concerns. Table 9 shows examples of several types of mechanisms. Mechanisms are 
specified to support each security requirements identified in the previous step. One mechanism can obviously 
support more than one security requirements. System security risk management can be more effective by deploying 
security mechanisms in a multilayer of system defenses. Reduction in security risks can be accomplished by 
applying several lines of system defense in sequence [Straub, 1998]. These lines of system defense are deterrence, 
prevention, detection, and recovery [Straub, 1998]. Loch, Carr, and Warkentin [1992] classify the lines of defense as 
protection, reduction, transfer, and financing. Based on the above two schemes, we classify security mechanisms 
under the following types of lines of system defense: 
 









Please refer to the appropriate sources [Straub, 1998; Loch, 1992; Mirkovic and Reiher 2004] for more details. Table 
9 presents a useful distinction among security mechanisms that can be used by managers and analysts to fine-tune 
the selection of appropriate countermeasures. Several security mechanisms, such as intrusion detection systems 
and audit logs, can be classified as both preventive and mitigation mechanisms. However, they are shown under 
only one category based on the nature of their predominant use. 
Table 9: Security Mechanisms Under Six-View Perspective of System Security Framework 
Security View Classification of 
Security Mechanisms 
Security Mechanisms 
Threat Prevention Threat Security Policy, Security Awareness and Training, Equipment 
Security, Access Control, Cryptography, Compliance with Threat 
Security Policy 
Mitigation Backup Procedure, Intrusion Detection System, Reconfiguration 
Mechanism 
Transfer Outsourcing, Compliance Outsourcing 
Financing (Coping) Threat Security Insurance 
Resource Prevention Resource Policy, Formal Standards for Establishing User Access, 
User ID Management, Management of Outside Users' Access, 
Periodic Evaluation of Access Rights, Approval of Access Rights, 
Resource Testing, Resource Maintenance 
Mitigation Resource Monitoring, Resource Redundancy, Data backup, 
Reconfiguration Mechanism 
Transfer Resource Outsourcing 
Financing  Resource Security Insurance 
Process Prevention Separation of Duties, User Account Controls, User Training, Swift 
Termination-Replacement Action, Process design Standards, Process 
Policy, Backup Controls 
Mitigation Process Audit Log, Process Monitoring 
Transfer Business Process Outsourcing 
Financing   
Assessment Prevention Assessment Policy, Assessment Training, Assessment Standards, 
Assessment Tools, Security Audit Tools, Penetration Analysis Tools, 
Vulnerability Detection Tools, Security Scanner Tools 
Mitigation Intrusion Detection System, Assessment Data Log 
Transfer Assessment Outsourcing 
Financing   
Management Prevention Policies and Procedures, Personnel Screening, Security Awareness 
Training, Backup Procedures, Vulnerability Assessment Tools, Facility 
Protection, Disposal of Unclassified Hard Drive and Other Devices, 
Scanning Tools, Configuration Management Tools, Monitoring, Swift 
Termination-handling Policy 
Mitigation Recovery Tools, Reconfiguration Tools, Intrusion Detection System 
Transfer Facility Protection Outsourcing 
Financing   
Legal Prevention Access Policy, Privacy Policy, Transparency and Control of Access 
Privileges, Audit History Reporting, Structured Access Privileges, 
Centralized Authentication and Authorization, Audit Log, Cross 
Functional Security Committee, Secure Shredding Bins, Spam 
Reporting, Spam Handling Tools 
Mitigation Audit Log, Intrusion Detection System 
Transfer Legal Outsourcing 
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Step 7. Development of the Security Assertion-Evidence Diagram 
So far, the MVWSSA method has covered the ascertainment phase of the assessment process. Based on the 
goals and the context of a work system, the above steps help identify the risk factors, security requirements, and 
security mechanisms. Steps 7 and 8 relate to the measurement phase of the assessment process. Here, we 
specify assertions and evidences and then collect data on evidences. We turn around and view the identified 
security mechanisms as if they already existed in the work system. We treat these security mechanisms as 
evidence for measurement purposes. This evidence, in turn, supports the security requirements, henceforth 
called assertions. We construct an assertion–evidence diagram for each asset of the work system. An assertion–
evidence diagram [Sun et al, 2006] consists of assertions, evidence, and their interrelationships. An assertion is 
basically a proposition that is logically supported by facts, observations, and illustrations. Evidence is a fact or 
information indicating whether an assertion is true or false. Assertions are generally organized in a hierarchical 
structure, including a main assertion and several sub-assertions. The main assertion is the highest level of 
assertion; the sub-assertions relate to the main assertion. Evidence represents the information that supports or 
negates assertions. In our method, a high level proposition about the security of an asset is the main assertion. 
All identified security requirements are treated as sub-assertions. The security mechanisms, as indicated earlier, 
are viewed as evidences. A security assertion-evidence diagram is in the form of a tree structure where each leaf 
node represents evidence. As an illustration, let us say that we have identified a Web server as an asset to be 
protected. In that case, the proposition “the Web server is protected” can be taken as the main (highest level) 
assertion about the security of the Web server. The identified security requirements to reduce the impact of each 
risk factor on the Web server are restated as propositions and viewed as sub-assertions. The needed security 
mechanisms are viewed as the evidence. Figure 4 shows a partial assertion–evidence diagram with the various 
levels of assertions and evidences. In Figure 4, an oval-shape symbol is used to represent an assertion. A 
rectangular-shape symbol is used to represent 
evidence.
 
Figure 4. A Partial Assertion-Evidence Diagram―An Illustration 
Step 8. Collection and Representation of Evidence Strength 
In this step, users and/or resident experts specify the strength of evidence, which indicates the level of support that a 
piece of evidence provides in favor of and/or against the assertion to which it pertains. Strength of evidence is 
represented by m-values [Shafer, 1976; Sun et al., 2006]. The m-value is the basic probability assignment function 
in Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) of Evidence [Shafer, 1976]. Evidence strength in the form of m-values is collected 
using various data collection techniques such as interview and survey. Evidence strength can also be obtained as a 
consensus based on inputs from multiple experts in order to avoid individual subjective judgment. The overall 
evidence strength of an evidence is represented as a m-value pair {n1, n2} where n1 represents the degree of belief 
by an assurance provider (user) that the evidence (security mechanism) is present in the work system, and n2 
represents the degree of belief by the assurance provider that the evidence is not present in the work system. The 
difference of 1- n1- n2 represents the ignorance assigned to the ambiguity of whether the evidence is present or not. 
In other words, let us say that there is an evidence “e” and the assurance provider feels positive about it and 
provides a support level of, say, 0.7 that the evidence “e” is present in the work system. At the same time, the 
assurance provider feels that there is no reason to believe that the evidence is not present (~e). This means that 0.7 
degree of support is assigned to “e,” 0.0 degree of support to “~e,” and the remaining 0.3 is ignorance assigned to 
the case of “not sure” {e, ~e}. Using a mathematical notation, we say m(e)=0.7, m(~e)=0.0, and m(e,~e)=0.3 where 
m(e) is the degree of support for “e” being true, m(~e) is the degree of support for “e” being not true, and m(e,~e) is 
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Step 9. Assessment of the Overall Level of Security Risk to Each Asset 
In this step, beliefs (belief functions) on assertions are computed by combining the strength of evidence (m-values) 
based on the diagram’s structure. This is done by propagating m-values through the diagram based on the 
Dempster’s rule of evidence combination [Sentz and Ferson, 2002; Sun et al., 2006]. The overall belief on each 
main assertion related to an asset is also computed based on the assertion–evidence diagram created in the 
previous step. The overall belief is computed using the Dempster’s rule for combining multiple belief functions and 
propagating m-values from sub-assertions back to the main assertion [Sentz and Ferson, 2002; Sun et al., 2006]. 
The computed overall belief function of a main assertion represents the assurance provider’s level of confidence in 
the main assertion. For example, let us say that the computed overall belief function of the assertion “the Web server 
is protected” is {0.85, 0.0}. This means that the assurance provider is 85 percent confident that the main assertion 
“the Web server is protected” is true and 0 percent confident that the main assertion is not true. There is, however, a 
15 percent ambiguity that the main assertion is not adequately protected. In other words, we can say that there is a 
15 percent overall security risk that the Web server is not adequately protected. 
The belief function of a main assertion is then compared against the pre-established security risk tolerance level as 
specified by the work system for each asset. The security risk tolerance level is specified for each asset by the 
owner of the work system under study. This evaluation then becomes the basis for the recommendations of 
new/additional security mechanisms. A tabular structure shown in Table 10 can be used to document the 
assessment results of the overall security risk for each asset. 




Function of the 
main assertion 
Belief Value for 
“not sure” 
(ignorance) in % 
Pre-established 
Risk Tolerance 
Level in % 
Recommended Mechanisms 
Preventive Mitigation 
Asset #1 … ...    
Asset #2 … …    
      
Asset #n … …    
 
The given risk tolerance level is then compared against the computed ignorance (not sure) risk level. If the 
ignorance risk level is higher than the given risk tolerance level, the suitable security mechanisms should be 
recommended to reduce the ignorance risk level. It may also be necessary to reexamine the adequacy of the 
identified security requirements before recommending the appropriate security mechanisms. A reassessment of the 
work system’s security risk with the added security mechanisms can be easily performed by repeating Steps 8–10 of 
the MVWSSA method. A software tool to automate the MVWSSA steps would be highly desirable. 
Step 10. Recommendation of Preventive and Mitigation Security Mechanisms 
In this step, a set of preventive and/or mitigation security mechanisms are recommended based on the evaluation of 
the overall belief function of each asset. The suggested mechanisms can be documented in Table 10, shown above. 
These recommendations can be explained in the form of a simple report that can be used as a guide for 
revamping/fine-tuning the security mechanisms of the work system. 
The above steps are illustrated through a real case in the next section. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MVWSSA METHOD 
We apply the Multi-View Work System Security Assessment (MVWSSA) method to assess the security risk of the 
University Digital Signage (UDS) system of a major university. The UDS system is relatively a new application, and it 
is currently in operation at the XYZ University. The real name of the university has been disguised in order to 
maintain anonymity. We approached the CIO of the university with a proposal to assess the security risk of a system 
within the IT Division. The CIO agreed and showed interest in assessing the security risk of the UDS system. The 
Assistant Vice President (AVP) for IT and ISO and a PC/Network support person participated in the assessment 
project on a regular basis. We refer to them as administrators in the subsequent discussions. 
The UDS system is described in Appendix A as a case study. A digital signage system is a form of an electronic 
display system that shows television programming, menus, information, advertising, and other messages. UDS 
supports digital signs (such as LCD, LED, plasma displays, or projected images) similar to the ones found in public 
and private environments, such as retail stores, hotels, and restaurants, as well as corporate or institution buildings. 
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Target Work System and Its Scope 
Here we establish the scope of the work system and define its boundary. The UDS system of the XYZ University is 
viewed as a target work system for assessing its risks. Figure 5 shows the scope of UDS as a work system. The 
work system serves several kinds of customers (users and consumers)—faculty, staff, students, and administrators. 
 
Figure 5. UDS as a Work System 
 
It seems that the XYZ University has very informal strategy when it comes to the operation and maintenance of the 
UDS work system. In addition, there are no separate written security policies to guide the security of this work 
system. However, the university does have a general security policy. 
The security policy should address the following policy areas as per the six views of the SVPSS [Yadav, 2010]: 
 Threat security policy dealing with natural disasters, viruses, hackers, etc. 
 Resource security policy dealing with the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the resources 
 Process security policy providing rules and guidelines for secure processes 
 Security assessment policy for developing standards and measures for evaluating security assessment 
activities 
 Legal security policy including rules to deal with privacy and legal laws affecting the UDS data 
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Identification of Digital Signage’s Assets 
The MVWSSA method suggests that assets be examined under each work system’s element. The UDS’s assets 
under various elements are listed in Table 11. Each work element was viewed with multiple perspectives in 
identifying the assets. 
 
Table 11: List of the UDS Work System’s Assets Under Various Work Elements 






Procurement Process–Interface, Content Importing Process–Interface, Procurement 
Process–Operator, Content Importing Process–Operator, Equipment Procurement 
standard, UDS Usage Training Policy, Installation Policy, Procurement Policy, 
Procurement Process Method, Content Process Importing Method, Procurement 
Process Assessment Criteria, Content Process Assessment Criteria  
Participants: 
Communication and 
Marketing Staff; System 
Administrator, IT Staff, 
Local administrator 
Communication and Marketing Staff, System Administrator, IT Staff, Administrator 
Skills, IT Staff Knowledge, Employee Confidentiality, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Compliance, System Administrator Accountability, Staff Screening, System Security 
Awareness Training, Personnel Policy, Code of Practice, Staff Performance Criteria, 
Staff Performance Evaluation, UDS Security Assessment Training 
Information: Data 
created and used by 
UDS 
Content, Data Backup, End-user Access Rights, Privacy Law Compliance, Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act Compliance, Intellectual Property Compliance, Texas 
Public Information Act Compliance, XYZ University Privacy Policy, Procurement 
Process Inputs, UDS Service Process Outputs, Procurement Process Assessment 
Policy, Procurement Process Assessment Data 
Technologies: VPN 
tools, PCs, Security 
tools 
Personal Computers, VPN Tools, Security Tools, Televisions, Nexus Client Software, 
Software Manual, PC-access Control, Procurement Process Management 
Techniques, Content Process Management Techniques, UDS Service and Web-
access Monitoring Tools, Technology Assessment Policy, Technology Assessment 
Criteria 
Products and Services: 
Digital Display Service  
Digital Display Service Review, Digital Display Service Specification, Digital Display 
Service design, Digital Millennium Copyright Act Compliance, Digital Display Service 
Quality Control, Digital Display Service Quality Monitoring, Digital Display Service 
Evaluation, Digital Display Service Quality Assurance Criteria 
Customers: 
End-users 
End-users (faculty, staff, students), USDSS Operator, Privacy Law Compliance, Staff 
Privacy Compliance, Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance, Staff Privacy 
Policy, Employee Accountability, Security Awareness Training, Personnel Screening 
Policy, Duty Segregation Policy, Employee Termination Security Policy, Equipment 
Procurement Process, UDS Usage Training Process 
Environments: Academic 
Campus Setting 
Equipment Room Perimeter, IT Division-Local Department Interface, Human 
Resource Policy, Secure Workplace Policy, Workplace Security Assessment 
Infrastructure: 
Digital Signage Portal 
Servers, Web Servers, 




Digital Signage Portal Server, Web Server, LAN, Router, Data Storage, Equipment 
Room, Shared Database, Software License, Database License, Software 
Maintenance Agreement, Software License Policy, Software Maintenance Policy, 
User Training Policy, Infrastructure Security Policy, Building Security Policy, 




UDS Operation, Work Schedule, Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
Compliance, OSHA-related Work System Policy, Work Schedule Policy, OSHA 
Compliance Assessment, Work System Operation Assessment 
Identification of Risk Factors for Digital Signage Assets Using Six-View Perspective of System 
Security (SVPSS) 
Here we identify risk factors for the assets of the UDS work system. Table 4 above can be used as a guide to 
identify risk factors under different views. In consultation with the administrators, we selected three assets from 
Table 11—Portal Server, Nexus Client Software, and Televisions—for further analysis and to identify the risk factors. 
Table 12 shows these risk factors in the “Sources of Risk or the Risk Factors” column of the Security Risk Register. 
The security views are utilized to help discover various kinds of risk factors for each asset. We will use this security 
risk register to show incrementally the progression of the MVWSSA method. In order to make it fit on the page, 
some columns of the Security Risk Register are omitted from the figures. 
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Table 12: Security Risk Register Showing Risk Factors for Several UDS Assets 
Security Risk Register―UDS―Risk Factors for Assets―MVWSSA Method 













Threat Wrong Digital Signage Portal Server Configuration   
 Denial of Service (DOS) Attack   
Resource Non-availability of Digital Signage Portal Server   
Legal Inadequate Support for the Content Data Retention 
Law 
  
 Inadequate Authorization to Access Contents 
Usage 
  
Management Inadequate Digital Signage Portal Sever Policy 
Framework 
  
 Poor Strategy for Backup and Recovery of Content   
Process Poor Monitoring of Digital Signage Portal Server 
Operation 
  
 Weak Digital Signage Portal Server Login Interface   
Assessment Inadequate Digital Signage Portal Performance 
Metrics 
  
 Poor Digital Signage Portal Assessment Training   
Televisions Threat Theft   
 Natural Disasters   
Resource Non-availability of TVs   
Legal Lack of Compliance with the Public Asset Retention 
Law 
  
Management Inadequate TV Installation Policy Framework   
 Poor Strategy for Protection of TV   
Process Poor Monitoring of TV Operation   
 Weak TV Monitoring Interface   
Assessment Inadequate TV Performance Metrics    




Threat Accidental Deletions by Employees   
 Virus Attack   
Resource Non-availability of Nexus Client Software   
 Disclosure of Nexus Client Software Data   
Legal Unlawful Usage   
Management Inadequate Usage Policy   
Process Inadequate Software License Validation Process   
Assessment Inadequate Security and Vulnerability Analysis   
 Poor Nexus Client Software Security and 
Vulnerability Assessment Criteria 
  
 
Evaluation and Prioritization of UDS Security Risks from Various Risk Factors 
In this step, the identified risk factors in the previous step were analyzed for system security risk. We established a 
risk level that was acceptable to the work system’s administrators. The administrators were asked to estimate the 
threat likelihood and the impact severity level for each risk factor. The administrators were given information on the 
concepts of threat likelihood and the impact severity level. Based on the administrators’ threat likelihood and impact 
severity estimates, we computed the resultant risk level for each risk factor by combining its likelihood estimate with 
its impact severity level as per Table 6 shown in Step 4 above. We then computed the risk priority level for each risk 
factor by subtracting its acceptable risk level from its resultant risk level as shown in the security risk register in 
Table 13. The security risk register has been split into three Tables —13, 14, and 15—in order to have better 
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Table 13: Security Risk Register Showing the Risk Priority Rating Level for the Portal Server’s Risk Factors 
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Table 14: Security Risk Register Showing the Risk Priority Rating Level for the Televisions’ Risk Factors 
Security Risk Register―UDS―Risk Priority Rating for Televisions―MVWSSA 
Assets Security 
View 





















Television Threat Theft Medium Serious  High 
(3) 
Very low  
(0) 
3 





Resource Non-availability of 
TVs 





Legal Lack of 
Compliance with 
the Public Asset 
Retention Law 
Low  Insignificant  Very low  
(0) 
Very low  
(0) 
0 
Management Inadequate TV 
Installation Policy 
Framework 





Poor Strategy for 
Protection of TV 





Process Poor Monitoring of 
TV Operation 













Assessment Inadequate TV 
Performance 
Metrics  














Table 15: Security Risk Register Showing the Risk Priority Rating Level for the Portal Server’s Risk factors 
Security Risk Register―UDS―Risk Priority Rating for Nexus Client Software―MVWSSA 
Assets Security 
View 



































Resource Non-availability of 
Nexus Client 
Software 


















Management Inadequate Usage 
Policy 
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Identification of UDS Security Requirements 
We note that the televisions and the Nexus Client software were considered for further analysis. Due to the lack of 
space, we focus only on the Nexus Client software for further discussion. The appropriate security requirements 
were identified using Table 8 of Step 5 as a guide. Table 16 shows the needed security requirements for every risk 
factor with priority level of 2 and above. A priority level of 2 was established as a cut-off point by the administrators 
based on their understanding of the UDS’s context. 
Table 16: Security Register Showing Security Requirements and Mechanisms  
for the Nexus Client Software Factors 
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Table 16: Security Register Showing Security Requirements and Mechanisms  












3 1. Collect data 
on measures 
of security and 
vulnerability 
analysis 












































Specification of Security Mechanisms (i.e., Evidences) for UDS 
Here we identified the appropriate security mechanisms, using Table 9 as a guide, to support the security 
requirements identified in the previous step. The security mechanisms are also documented in Table 16. 
Development of the Security Assertion-Evidence Diagram for Digital Signage 
Based on the identified security requirements and mechanisms, we developed the security assertion–evidence 
diagram for the Nexus Client software. The assertion–evidence diagram is shown in Figure 6. 
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Collection and Representation of Evidence Strength for Nexus Client Software 
Real data on evidence strength for UDS was collected by sending a questionnaire to the administrators. A 
presentation on the ideas of assertion and evidence was made to the administrators prior to sending the 
questionnaire. The two administrators estimated the strength of evidence for each mechanism shown in rectangles 
in Figure 7. An average of evidence strength for each mechanism was computed and is shown in Figure 7. For 
example, as per the administrators’ estimation, the evidence strength for the anti-virus software is 0.8. 
 
Figure 7. Assertion–Evidence Diagram with Propagated Evidence Strength 
Assessment of the Overall Level of Security Risk to Nexus Client Software 
Figure 7 also shows the overall belief function for the sub-assertions and the main assertion. These belief functions 
were computed using the evidence combination rules [Srivastava and Shafer, 1992; Sentz and Ferson, 2002; Sun et 
al., 2006]. The readers are referred to the cited work for details on combination rules for computing belief functions. 
As shown in Figure 7, the overall belief function of the assertion “Nexus Client software is secure” is {0.50, 0.0}. The 
equations and the computational process are excluded from the article due to the lack of space. Table 17 
documents the assessment results. It indicates that there is a 50 percent (1 - 0.50 - 0.0) security risk that the Nexus 
Client software is not adequately protected. The pre-established risk tolerance level was established as 1 percent by 
the administrators. This indicates that the additional security requirements and/or mechanisms may be needed to 






Volume 34 Article 8 
191 


























{.5,0.0} 50 1 Yes   
Recommendation of Preventive and Mitigation Security Mechanisms for Digital Signage 
In this step, a review of the existing security requirements and mechanisms may be performed to recommend 
appropriate security mechanisms. In the case of UDS, we see from Figure 7 that the UDS system’s security risk can 
be reduced by reviewing its usage training, security and vulnerability assessment policy, and transparency and 
control access privileges. Anti-virus software should be updated regularly. In addition, a periodic evaluation of 
access rights should be instituted. As a mitigation mechanism, a log of software risk assessment data should be 
maintained. The recommended mechanisms are shown in Table 18. 






























{.50,0.0} 50 1 Yes Nexus Client software 
usage training review,  
Nexus Client software 
security and vulnerability 
assessment policy review, 
Review of transparency 











A detailed recommendation report can be prepared based on the information in Table 18. 
The above real case application demonstrates the use of the MVWSSA method. It supports the whole security risk 
assessment process fully. It provides a better structure and guidelines to support all three phases—ascertainment, 
measurement, and evaluation―of the security risk assessment process. 
V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER METHODS 
Tables 1 documented the comparison of several models and methods in the extant literature. Our foregoing 
discussion of the proposed MVWSSA method shows that the proposed method covers more aspects of the system 
security risk assessment process as compared to other methods. It integrates the ideas from qualitative as well as 
quantitative models and methods into a complete system security assessment method taking into account the 
multiple security views of a work system. 
In comparison to the previous methods, our method is more comprehensive, adaptable, and practical for use by 
system and security risk analysts. Our method not only provides steps and guidelines to help analysts determine 
security requirements and mechanisms but also includes steps and guidelines for measuring and evaluating the 
strength of existing security mechanisms of a work system. Most of the other methods do not cover the security 
assessment process completely. For example, Sun, Srivastava, and Mock [2006] present a very good assessment 
method that focuses on security risk’s evidence measurement and evaluation. However, their method provides little 
support for the ascertainment phase of the assessment process. Similarly, other models such as Yadav’s SVPSS 
framework [Yadav, 2010] and Alter and Sherer’s Model [Alter and Sherer, 2004] support the ascertainment phase 
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It is adaptable in the sense that the proposed method does not have to be used in its entirety in every situation. For 
example, if an analyst wants to do only the system security risk analysis and is interested only in the ascertainment 
phase of the process, then only Steps 1 through 6 of the method could be used. On the other hand, if an analyst 
wants to just evaluate the existing security mechanisms of a work system, then only Steps 7 through 10 need to be 
used. Obviously, the method can be used to examine and protect any set of selected assets. Our method is more 
useful in identifying and evaluating all kinds of risk factors. It also relates the risk factors directly with the 
corresponding security requirements, mechanisms and their implementation in a work system. 
According to standard dictionaries, “practical” is defined as having “useful ends in view; capable of useful action.” 
The method covers beginning-to-end activities of security risk assessment with clearly defined outputs at each step. 
The proposed method produces very useful information that can be readily used in practice. 
VI. Conclusions and Future Work 
This article has presented a comprehensive system security risk assessment method that covers all three phases of 
the system security risk assessment process. More specifically, the method includes: 
1. A multiple-view perspective of system security 
2. A set of guidelines for carrying out the steps 
3. Steps to ascertain, measure, and evaluate work system security risk 
The method integrates ideas from extant models and methods into a coherent set of steps for supporting the system 
security risk assessment process completely. It extends existing system security methods by incorporating new 
ideas of multifaceted security view and work system into a coherent set of steps to ascertain security requirements, 
to measure the evidence for the needed security requirements, and to evaluate the evidence against the needed 
security mechanisms. 
The MVWSSA method was applied successfully to an UDS system. Treating UDS as a work system and applying 
multi-view security perspective, the method enabled us to identify a more complete set of assets, security 
requirements, and mechanisms. 
The MVWSSA method takes a broader and multi-view of assets that may be vulnerable to threats and other security 
risks. This may lead to the identification of many assets. Identification of too many assets may be considered to be a 
limitation of the method. However, we feel that, in today’s complex business environment, it is always better to 
identify all assets than miss some that may turn out to be critical later on. It is always possible to ignore the assets 
from further consideration if they do not seem important to the work system under study. This recommendation for 
identifying all assets may seem at odds with the concept of Open Information Society [Ahituv, 2001] where 
everything is accessible to everyone. However, we feel that an ideal open information society is a long way away 
and the current trend in security threats suggests that, in the meantime, businesses have to protect all their assets. 
Real world implications of security risk assessment methods and frameworks are very important to consider. A 
method is not very practical if it cannot be used effectively. Bob Violino [CSO, 2010] discusses real-world 
experiences of four IT risk assessment frameworks—OCTAVE, FAIR, NIST RMF, and TARA. Complexity, lack of 
quantitative modeling, difficult to use, poor documentation, and lack of automation are the major drawbacks in using 
IT risk assessment frameworks [CSO, 2010]. We believe that system security risk assessment is inherently a 
complex process. However, a security risk assessment method can be made easier to use through automation, 
proper documentation, and illustration. For example, an automated tool can incorporate case-based reasoning 
approach to offer illustration and examples in addition to automating the security risk assessment method. 
We plan to apply the MVWSSA method to case studies involving several work systems. A software tool to support 
and automate most of the steps of the method is also in the offing. 
VII. LIMITATIONS 
The MVWSSA method, just like many existing security risk assessment methods, is complex. One of the reasons for 
it being complex is that it covers all the three phases of SSR assessment process. Another reason is the lack of a 
software tool to support the method. 
It can be argued that the proposed research, like many extant works on methods and models, is intuition-driven and 
not theory-driven. The proposed method does extend the pragmatic and conceptual work of other researchers. 
However, the conceptual ideas behind the steps of the MVWSSA method may not be fully formalized. It would be 
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insightful to explain the theoretical underpinnings of the proposed method. Exposition and formalization of the 
method-relevant theoretical underpinnings could be an excellent topic for future research. 
The average of evidence strength for each mechanism was computed based on the data collected from two 
administrators during the data collection for the UDS case study. In general, an average of two data points may not 
be sufficient. In this study, however, the two administrators were the only individuals with the intimate knowledge of 
UDS. Therefore, the data on evidence strength was collected from only two people. 
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APPENDIX A: UNIVERSITY DIGITAL SIGNAGE SYSTEM 
Introduction 
Digital signage system is a form of electronic display that shows television programming, menus, information, 
advertising, and other messages. Digital signs (such as LCD, LED, plasma displays, or projected images) can be 
found in public and private environments, such as retail stores, hotels, and restaurants, as well as corporate or 
institution buildings. In this article, a public university with the business requirement for digital signage system is 
considered. In the following subsections, a brief description of the organization and its exiting digital signage system 
is provided. 
XYZ Public University Digital Signage System 
XYZ University has a large population of students, faculty, and staff. It is mentioned in the IT Division’s strategic plan 
that IT Division should make the needed information easily available to students, faculty, and staff. To fulfill this 
objective, for the last four years, XYZ University IT Division, along with representatives from interested areas and 
departments, have been evaluating and testing various digital signage solutions for information displays in campus 
buildings and facilities. In the last year, the assessment team selected a software product that best suits the campus 
needs—Nexus. In April 2010, IT Division upgraded the university events calendar program and scrolling monitor 
systems to the Nexus software. The new approach allows the display of richer, more robust content, including Web 
pages, videos, and lives news data. Departments are also able to implement digital signage in their own areas, 
customizing the content and display for their purposes. However, during an emergency, a centrally managed digital 
signage will be used to display emergency notifications and alerts from the President’s office. Many XYZ University 
areas have expressed interest in using digital signage in collaboration with the XYZ University’s IT Division, 
including the Advising Center, Athletics, College of Architecture, College of Human Sciences, College of Mass 
Communications, Communications and Marketing, College of Business, Student Union, and University Student 
Housing. Before the UDS system was put into service, IT Division collaborated with two local departments to pilot 
the Nexus-powered digital signage in their respective areas in addition to the IT Division locations. 
The UDS system is based on client-server model. The central digital signage portal server connects database 
information (from a database server) to the end-user or client program through the XYZ University’s intranet. The 
Digital Signage Content Portal provides a user interface for importing content and installing software. The local 
workstations consist of Dell OptiPlex personal computers, 55-inch or 44-inch TV, and operating and application 
software. The pre-installed software includes Microsoft Office 2010, Adobe Reader X, Adobe Flash Player, and 
Nexus Client. The Nexus Client software is responsible for the interaction between local PC and the Digital Signage 
Content Portal. The local clients can install other software depending on the displayed content format. 
Core Business Processes of XYZ Public University Digital Signage System 
UDS’s primary business processes are described below: 
A. Procurement Process 
After the UDS system’s usage is approved, IT Division sends the quote of equipment that is necessary for the 
installation of UDS. The users order all the equipment. 
B. Import Process 
The end users import the content they want to display on the UDS system through the Digital Signage Content 
Portal. 
Scope of Security Assessment 
The UDS system is selected as the target work system for the security assessment. All the work elements of the 
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Table A1: Work Elements of UDS 
Work Elements Description 
Customers Students, Faculties, Colleges, Departments which have installed Digital Signage System 
(DSS) 
Products & Services Events Display, Emergency Message, Advertisements 
Business Process Software Installation Process, Procurement Process, Training Process, Content 
Importing Process 
Participants IT Division Staff, Maintenance staff, Server Administrator, Communication and Marketing 
Manager 
Information Content, Data Backup 
Technologies Content Portal, LDC, User Interface, RSS Reader 
Infrastructure Network infrastructure, Database server, Web server 
Environment Academic setting 
Strategies Manually customized approach 
Current State of UDS System Security 
The technical design and the security architecture of the UDS system under consideration seem to be reasonably 
well-designed and documented. However, the XYZ University’s IT Division does not have a formal (written) security 
policy for this specific work system. There is an overall IT Security Policy for information technology, which is too 
general for a specific work system. There are only informal plans and procedures for the operation of the UDS 
system. 
The current IT Security Policy that can be applied to UDS includes Computer Security and Privacy Policy, Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, Intellectual Property, Laws and XYZ University Policies, Personal Information Privacy, 
Texas Public Information Act, and XYZ University Privacy Policy. Group policy and active directory are used to 
control the security risk for the UDS. 
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